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TITLE VII-EIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS
THAT "REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION"
LANGUAGE DOES NOT REQUIRE




ITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discharging any employee on the basis of that employee's relig-
ion.1 The statute further explains that employers must accommo-
date "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accom-
modate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's bus-
iness."' 2 Unfortunately for employers, the statute provides very little gui-
dance regarding what level of accommodation is required when they are
faced with a real conflict. Presented with the problem of defining the con-
cept of reasonable accommodation, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Ti-
tle VII does not necessarily require an employer to eliminate the conflict
between work and an employee's religious beliefs.3 In some cases, such a
requirement would force an employer to violate a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) or ignore the rights of other employees. 4 While the
Eighth Circuit somewhat undermined its conclusion by ultimately finding
for the employee, Sturgill v. United Parcel Service acknowledges that after
looking at the totality of the circumstances, a court may determine that
employees, as well as employers, must compromise in order to resolve
workplace conflicts. 5
The "reasonable accommodation" question arose in May 2004 when
Sturgill joined the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which prohibited him
from working between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday. 6 As a
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
3. Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1028.
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UPS driver, Sturgill's shift was not over until all of the packages that had
been pre-loaded in his truck that morning had been delivered. 7 During
the holiday season, this practice often required drivers to work long days,
so Sturgill requested that UPS exempt him from work after sundown on
Fridays, and as a compromise, he offered several alternative suggestions. 8
His request was reviewed by the Labor Relations and Human Resources
managers who determined that such accommodations would be inconsis-
tent with UPS's operations and with the CBA between UPS and the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters. 9 The conflict could have been
eliminated by transferring Sturgill to a different job, but none were avail-
able at the time, and any future job openings would be filled according to
a seniority system.' 0 Although UPS denied Sturgill's request, his immedi-
ate shift supervisor frequently accommodated him by moving his pack-
ages to other drivers so Sturgill could finish by sundown.1 This informal
accommodation worked until December 17, 2004 when Sturgill could not
finish his deliveries and no other drivers were available to help him. 12
Sturgill quit working at sundown, leaving thirty-five packages undeliv-
ered, and UPS terminated him for abandoning his job.13
At trial, Sturgill argued two theories of liability under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 He claimed that UPS discriminated against
him because of his religion, and alternatively, that he was terminated be-
cause UPS failed to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs.' 5 The
jury found for UPS on the discrimination claim, but found for Sturgill on
the claim that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate his religious be-
liefs, awarding him $103,722.25 in compensatory damages and
$207,444.50 in punitive damages.16 The district court additionally
awarded Sturgill $134,838.37 in attorneys' fees and an injunction requir-
ing UPS to accommodate his religious beliefs in the future. 17 UPS ap-
pealed the decision, arguing that the district court wrongfully instructed
the jury that "an accommodation is reasonable if it eliminates the conflict
between the Plaintiff's religious beliefs and Defendant's work require-
ments and reasonably permits Plaintiff to continue to be employed by
Defendant.' 8
The Eighth Circuit thus faced the issue of whether a reasonable accom-
modation must eliminate or simply minimize the conflict between work
obligations and an employee's religious beliefs. Rejecting both of the stat-
7. Id. at 1027.








16. Id. at 1027.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1030.
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utory interpretations argued by Sturgill and UPS, the Eighth Circuit held
that "[w]hat is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances
and therefore might, or might not, require elimination of a particular,
fact-specific conflict."1 9 In making this decision, the court recognized that
certain factors, such as CBAs and the rights of other employees, pre-
vented them from mandating that employers must always eliminate the
conflict between work and one employee's religious beliefs. 20 In some
cases, eliminating a religious conflict would impose an undue hardship on
employers by requiring them to take actions inconsistent with otherwise
valid employment agreements. 21 Instead, the reasonableness of an ac-
commodation "turns on fact-intensive issues such as work demands, the
strength and nature of the employee's religious conviction, the terms of
an applicable CBA, and the contractual rights and workplace attitudes of
co-workers." '22 Imposing an arbitrary rule on reasonable accommodations
could result in the unequal treatment of employees; therefore, the Eighth
Circuit held the district court incorrectly instructed the jury. 23 However,
the court lessens the impact of this decision by determining that regard-
less of the reasonable accommodation dispute, the jury's verdict was justi-
fied by Sturgill's evidence of a "one-time failure to accommodate
resulting in the severe sanction of termination" and the UPS's failure to
prove that further accommodation would have caused undue hardship.2 4
In holding that a reasonable accommodation is not necessarily required
to eliminate all conflicts between work and religious beliefs, the Eighth
Circuit primarily relied on two United States Supreme Court cases that
support this interpretation of Title VII.25 In Hardison, a factually similar
case, Trans World Airlines (TWA) fired an employee for insubordination
when he refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons.2 6 Although
TWA attempted to accommodate him, it could not change his shift with-
out violating the union's seniority system, nor could it allow him to work
four days a week without impairing airline operations.27 The Supreme
Court held that while employers have a Title VII duty to accommodate
an employee's religious beliefs, it would result in undue hardship to re-
quire them to do so in a manner that would be "inconsistent with the
otherwise valid [collective bargaining] agreement" or that would deprive
other employees of their seniority rights.28 The second Supreme Court
decision relied upon by the Eighth Circuit held that an employer is not
required to accept a reasonable accommodation proposed by an em-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1033.
21. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
22. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1033.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1030-33 (relying on Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68
(1986); Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79).
26. 432 U.S. at 69.
27. Id at 68.
28. Id. at 79
2009]
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ployee.29 In Ansonia, the Supreme Court concluded that an employer
reasonably accommodated an employee by requiring him to take unpaid
leave for holy day observance even though the employee preferred a dif-
ferent accommodation.30 According to the Eighth Circuit, the Ansonia
holding did not suggest "that an accommodation, to be reasonable as a
matter of law, must eliminate any religious conflict."'31 Instead, the Su-
preme Court looked to the legislative history of Title VII that supported
"flexibility" and "bilateral cooperation" between employers and employ-
ees when reconciling the employee's religion with the employer's busi-
ness needs. 32 Based on this idea of compromise, the Eighth Circuit
determined that "the [Supreme] Court's reference to 'elimina[ting] the
conflict' was not intended to pronounce a rule that all employees-absent
undue hardship-must receive accommodations that eliminate any con-
flict between religion and work."'33
In addition to these two Supreme Court cases, the Eighth Circuit
looked to other cases in the Eighth, Third, and Fifth Circuits that were
also inconsistent with Sturgill's argument and dismissed opposing deci-
sions from the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.34 The Eighth
Circuit found support for the proposition that an employer's accommoda-
tion should not provide special treatment at the expense of other employ-
ees in one of its own previous holdings.35 Wilson held that requiring an
employer to instruct employees that they must tolerate another em-
ployee's highly graphic, offensive, and religiously-motivated anti-abortion
button was contrary to the purpose of religious accommodation. 36 Simi-
larly, the Third and Fifth Circuits have held that transferring an employee
to another position is reasonable as a matter of law, even if the transfer
only reduces the possibility of religious conflict, instead of eliminating
it. 37 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have consistently found for employers
when allowing an employee not to work on the Sabbath would violate a
CBA, a seniority system, or company scheduling procedures.38 Oddly, al-
though the Second and Seventh Circuits have declared that a reasonable
accommodation must eliminate any religion-work conflict, the courts in
those circuits actually affirmed judgments for employers.39 The other cir-
cuits agreeing with the Second and Seventh Circuits simply ignore An-
29. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68.
30. Id. at 64, 69.
31. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031.
32. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69.
33. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031.
34. Id. at 1031-33.
35. Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995).
36. Id.
37. Bruff v. N. Miss. Health Servs., 244 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2001); Shelton v. Univ.
of Med. & Dentistry, 223 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2000).
38. Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1993); Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d
336, 338 (8th Cir. 1992); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (5th Cir.
1982).
39. Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2002); Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d
214, 217 (7th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 62
Casenote
sonia and rely instead on their own decisions predating that Supreme
Court opinion.4 0 For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit concluded that in
determining the reasonableness of an employer's accommodation, the
court must look at the totality of the circumstances, instead of only at
whether the religious conflict was eliminated. 41
Although it may initially seem counterintuitive, by holding that an em-
ployer may not be able to eliminate religious conflicts in every situation,
the Eighth Circuit actually fulfills the purpose of Title VII by prohibiting
unequal treatment on the basis of religion. CBAs and seniority systems
are religion-neutral ways of "minimizing the number of occasions when
an employee must work on a day that he would prefer to have off."
42
These agreements, which "lie[ ] at the core of our national labor policy,"
are "aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between
management and labor."'43 They encourage bilateral cooperation by re-
quiring both employers and employees to make compromises in order to
create a fair and impartial system of determining shifts and time off.
44
Like Title VII, they are put in place with the goal of treating all employ-
ees as equally as possible, whether they are members of a religious minor-
ity or not. Forcing employers to ignore these agreements and make
special exceptions for certain groups of employees defeats the purpose of
collective bargaining. As the Supreme Court noted in Hardison: "It
would be anomalous to conclude that by 'reasonable accommodation'
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in
order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others. '4 5 There-
fore, courts should not arbitrarily decide that employers must always
eliminate the conflict between work and religion to make a reasonable
accommodation because there are other circumstances that must be con-
sidered. Because the Supreme Court has stated that an employer should
not have to discriminate against one employee to accommodate another,
the Eighth Circuit correctly held that it was improper to instruct a jury
that a reasonable accommodation must always eliminate the religious
conflict.46
But this decision did not ultimately change the outcome of Sturgill. In-
stead, the Eighth Circuit made a decision on the issue but refused to ap-
ply its new rule to the facts of the case-essentially the very thing it
earlier criticized the Second and Seventh Circuits for doing.47 The Eighth
Circuit undermined its conclusion on reasonable accommodations by
finding for Sturgill. Although UPS determined that the only way it could
40. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v.
Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987).
41. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1033.
42. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 78.
43. Id. at 79.
44. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031, 1033.
45. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.
46. Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1033.
47. Id. at 1032-33.
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accommodate Sturgill within the guidelines of the CBA was to offer him
the chance to bid on another job as it became available, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that UPS could have explored "whether there were additional
procedures ... that could be employed to help Sturgill avoid Friday work
conflicts in the interim."'48 Disregarding its own directive to consider the
totality of the circumstances, the court ignored testimony that Sturgill's
supervisor informally accommodated him to the best of his ability, incon-
veniencing other drivers in the process.49 The Eighth Circuit also incor-
rectly concluded that UPS failed to present "real rather than speculative"
evidence that accommodating Sturgill would have been an undue hard-
ship.50 Yet, in addition to noting the very real conflicts arising with the
CBAs and seniority system, UPS further argued that accommodating
Sturgill would have required UPS to force less efficient drivers to work
excessive overtime.51 Title VII does not require an employer to discrimi-
nate against some employees in order to enable others to observe their
Sabbath, yet the Eighth Circuit essentially insisted that UPS should have
done so in order to meet the burden of undue hardship. Title VII does
not actually require employers to suffer the undue hardship. By finding
that the jury instruction was not a reversible error, the Eighth Circuit
refused to stand by its decision that a reasonable accommodation does
not have to eliminate all religious conflicts.52
An initial reading of the Eighth Circuit's decision may seem to give
employers the upper hand and allow them to ignore religious conflicts in
the presence of valid CBAs and seniority systems. In his Hardison dis-
sent, Justice Marshall argued that allowing employers to hide behind
CBAs "holds, in essence, that although the EEOC regulations and the
Act state that an employer must make reasonable adjustments in his
work demands to take account of religious observances, the regulation
and the Act do not really mean what they say."'53 Sturgill does not go that
far. Instead, it demonstrates that even when the court considers addi-
tional circumstances, it is still exceedingly difficult for employers to avoid
eliminating religious conflicts. In fact, the Eighth Circuit noted that
"there may be many situations in which the only reasonable accommoda-
tion is to eliminate the religious conflict altogether. ' 54 Sturgill does not
give employers the ability to get around Title VII; instead, it merely sug-
gests that there are often other factors involved that make an arbitrary
rule impractical. Sturgill simply acknowledged that while employers are
always required to make serious efforts to reasonably accommodate their
employees' religious beliefs, courts should have the freedom to require
employees, in some cases, to make accommodations as well.
48. Id. at 1033.
49. Id. at 1028.
50. Id. at 1033.
51. Id. at 1029.
52. Id. at 1033 n.4.
53. Hardison, 432 U.S. 86-87.
54. Sturgill, 512 F.3d 1033 (emphasis added).
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